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CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND SECURITY TRANSACTIONS-
1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
FORREST W. LACEY*
Fraudulent Conveyances: In Nashville Milk Producers, Inc. v. Al-
ston' a bill to set aside transfers of a herd of dairy cattle alleged that
the debtor in 1953 purported to transfer the herd to his wife, and
that in 1955 the wife purported to transfer the herd to their son.
Both transfers were alleged to have been made for no consideration,
or a consideration that was not fair and adequate. The bill also
charged that the conveyances rendered the grantor insolvent, and
were part of a general scheme participated in by all three defendants
to hinder, delay and defraud existing and subsequent creditors. De-
fendants' answer consisted solely of denial of the charges of fraud and
lack of consideration, and gave no explanation of the transfers. None
of the defendants testified, and no evidence was introduced on their
behalf. It was stipulated that bills of sale were never recorded, and
defendants' counsel admitted he did not know whether the sales were
evidenced by written instruments. Complainant's evidence established
his claim for a feed bill incurred-in 1954, that debtor was lessee of the
farm on which the herd was at all times kept, and that the herd was
under the control and management of the debtor after the alleged
transfers.
On these facts the chancellor dismissed the bill insofar as it sought
to set aside the transfers as fraudulent. He ruled that the conveyance
in 1953 was not fraudulent in law as to complainant because his debt
was not then in existence, that the 1955 conveyance was not fraudulent
as to complainant because the grantor was not indebted to him, and
because the proof did not establish insolvency.
The court of appeals modified the chancellor's decree and set aside
the conveyances, holding that the failure of defendants to introduce
evidence to dispel the suspicion of fraud required the relief sought.
Several earlier Tennessee decisions are cited in support of this holding.
The result reached by the court seems sound and clearly sustainable
under section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which
provides that every conveyance made without fair consideration by
one engaged in business for which the property remaining in his
hands, after the conveyance, is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to persons who become creditors during continuation of
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 307 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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such business, without regard to actual intent.2 (It should be noted
that Tennessee Code Annotated section 64-313 reads ". . . during the
continuance of such business transaction without regard to his actual
interest," instead of "during the continuation of such business or
transaction without regard to his actual intent" as it is in the Uniform
Act.) (Emphasis added.)
Unfortunately, the exact basis of the decision remains uncertain,
and the opinion contains language which may cause future confusion.
The opinion notes the existence of the statutory sections dealing with
conveyances by persons engaged in business, and by those contemplat-
ing incurring debts beyond their ability to pay, but gives no indication
of reliance upon them.3 As the chancellor found the proof did not
establish insolvency, and this finding is not set aside by the court,
the decision seems to stand as one finding actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors.
In reaching its decision the court apparently relies to some extent
upon continued possession by the seller as constituting prima facie
evidence of fraud, as the opinion cites several cases to that effect. But
principal emphasis in the opinion is on the failure of the defendants
to testify and explain the transactions questioned. In this connection
there is stressed the fact that the answers were not sworn to, and that
persons charged with fraud but not guilty thereof are eager to give an
explanation that will remove suspicion. It is not clear, at least to
this writer, whether the court held that the failure of defendants to
testify created a presumption of fraud which was not rebutted, or
whether the failure to testify was significant because as a result
thereof defendants failed to discharge an evidential burden cast upon
them, or both. The concluding part of the opinion indicates that it
was failure to discharge an evidential burden which caused the court
to hold as it did.4 But the nature of this burden is left uncertain. The
opinion first cites an earlier decision5 to the effect that:
Where fraud is involved and complainant introduces proof casting sus-
picion on the transaction, defendant charged with fraud has the burden
of proceeding with the evidence to overcome the suspicion, and when
this is done the burden of proof continues on complainant. 6
The opinion then states:
2. Although no Tennessee decision has passed upon this question, farming
has been treated as a business in other states. Holcomb v. Nunes, 132 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 283 P.2d 301 (1955-cattle farm); Wolfkill v. Johnson, 34 Wash.
2d 759, 209 P.2d 775 (1949-chicken farm).
3. 307 S.W.2d at 70.
4. Id. at 72.
5. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Conner, 23 Tenn. App. 1, 126 S.W.2d
347 (1938).
6. 307 S.W.2d at 71.
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Where a complainant seeking to set aside conveyances by a husband to
his wife, introduced evidence casting suspicion upon the transaction and
warranting a suspicion of fraud, the burden of proof shifts to the de-
fendant.7
It is difficult, too, to understand what the court had in mind when it
stated: "The opinion in Churchhill v. Wells, 47 Tenn. 364, expresses
the rule that is particularly applicable here." The opinion then quotes
from the Churchhill opinion to the effect that a conveyance made on
the eve of incurring an indebtedness, from property on which creditors
rely, is fraudulent, and quotes further:
...such conveyance is not relieved from its fraudulent character by the
fact that it has been registered, if the creditor has no actual notice, and
the conveyance, without his negligence, operates as a surprise on him.8
The court's inclusion of this statement seems odd both because it is
inconsistent with a recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court,9
noted in last year's survey, 0 which held that registration of a fraudu-
lent conveyance protected it against subsequent creditors, and because
it is clear in the instant case the conveyances were never registered."
The opinion does reveal facts which could raise the question of the
duty of a subsequent creditor to inquire as to whether or not a con-
veyance had been made.12 After first stating that the complainant did
not hear of the transfers until after the extension of credit, the opinion
notes that the agent of complainant knew, at the time the debt was
incurred, that the milk account, as carried on the books of the Federal
Milk Market Administrator, had been changed to the wife and later
to the son. The agent inquired of the debtor as to the reason why the
name of the account was in the name of the son, and testified that
he was told "it was all right as it was still in the family and that it
was done merely to keep his son out of military service." Although
such knowledge by complainant's agent might well be deemed to
require further inquiry than was made, the opinion makes no mention
of this as a factor in the decision.
Two other cases dealing with fraudulent conveyances are more
routine. Gemignani v. Partee13 involved questions primarily of fact.
Four pieces of property were involved. The jury found that the
debtor did not "directly or through the instrumentality of other
persons, transfer or convey, without adequate consideration, any
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 72.
9. Butler v. Holland, 289 S.W.2d 701 (Tenn. 1956).
10. Hartman, Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions, 10 VAND. L. REV.
1058 (1957).
11. 307 S.W.2d at 69.
12. Id. at 68-69.
13. 302 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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assets or property owned by him."'14 The chancellor also made findings
of fact, including findings that three of the four properties had not
been the subject of fraudulent transfer. The court of appeals held
that one of the three had been fraudulently conveyed, and modified
the decree so as to subject debtor's interest therein, as a tenant by the
entirety, to the creditor's judgment.
The real property found to have been fraudulently conveyed was,
at the time of an auto accident which lead to suits against the debtors
for a large sum, in the possession of debtor and his wife under a con-
tract to purchase. Thereafter debtor caused the deed to be executed
to his wife alone. In invalidating this transfer, the court said their
conclusion did not conflict with the jury's finding because "it does
not appear that the jury ever found... that on June 8, 1949, Ed Partee
was the equitable owner of an estate by the entirety in said ... prop-
erty .... ,115 The jury had found, however, that no "assets" had been
fraudulently conveyed.
The decision is further recognition of the Tennessee law that the
interest of a tenant by the entirety may be sold in satisfaction of a
judgment.16
In Beaty v. Hood1' the chancellor's determination that no fraudulent
conveyance had been made was affirmed largely because the record
on appeal was so meager and incomplete the court could not tell
whether there had been a compliance with statutory requirements as
to recording, or even whether the alleged fraudulent grantor had ever
even owned the property in question.
Motor Vehicle Title Registration Law: Manufacturers Acceptance
Corporation v. Vaughn,18 applying the Motor Vehicle Title Registra-
tion Law19 to an involved factual situation, is especially noteworthy to
auto dealers and finance companies. One Cookston traded in an auto
to a dealer, Gentry, apparently without executing even a bill of sale.
The certificate of title was not assigned because it was in the possession
of a lien holder, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Gentry then
sold the auto to Vaughn, giving Vaughn a bill of sale and taking from
him a title retention note. Gentry having paid the amount owed by
Cookston to G.M.A.C., G.M.A.C. forwarded the title certificate to
Cookston with a statement showing satisfaction of the lien. Vaughn
obtained the certificate from Cookston's wife, and procured another
14. Id. at 823.
15. Id. at 829.
16. Hartman, Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions, 10 VAND. L. REV.
1058, 1071 (1957).
17. 306 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
18. 305 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
19. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-101 to -608 (1956).
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to forge Cookston's name assigning the title certificate to Vaughn.
This forgery was in the presence of a notary public, who did not swear
the forger. Vaughn then applied for a transfer of title to himself. He
took a copy of the application for a title to Manufacturers Acceptance
Corporation who loaned him $1000, and took his copy of the applica-
tion. Gentry never registered his lien with the Motor Vehicle Division,
and Manufacturers did not register until more than three weeks after
making the loan. Meanwhile the Division sent to Vaughn a certificate
showing no encumbrances, and on the strength of this Southern
Acceptance Corporation made a loan to him. Southern promptly
forwarded the certificate and their lien to Division for registration,
which was accomplished before Manufacturers lien notice was
received by the Division. Thereafter Vaughn returned the auto to
Gentry, and was given a release of title retention note. Manufacturers
then brought a replevin action against Gentry and Vaughn, and
Gentry filed a cross-bill bringing in G.M.A.C., Southern, the notary
public and the notary's surety. The chancellor held that Southern's
lien had first priority, and that neither G.M.A.C. nor the notary was
liable to Gentry or Manufacturers. This decision was affirmed on
appeal.
The superiority of Southern's lien seems clear. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 59-326 expressly provides that no lien or title reten-
tion shall be valid against subsequent encumbrancers without actual
notice until the requirements of the registration law shall have been
complied with. Section 59-327 provides that filing of notice of lien
with the Motor Vehicle Division and notation upon the certificate of
title shall be the exclusive method of giving constructive notice of
encumbrances upon titles to autos.
Gentry and Manufacturers contended that G.M.A.C. was negligent
in forwarding the title certificate to the original owner, Cookston.
With respect to this claim, the court held G.M.A.C. not to be liable
because of Gentry's contributory negligence, because the certificate
showed Cookston as owner and the statute makes it the duty of the
lien holder to return the certificate to the owner upon satisfaction of
the lien, because the cross-bill was never amended to set forth the
position relied on at the hearing, viz.-that Gentry had specifically
requested G.M.A.C. to forward the certificate to it-and finally, that
intervening independent causes made the loss possible.
As to the notary public, who admitted he did not know the forger
and did not formally swear him, the court said it was"unable to say
he failed to exercise ordinary care in identifying the man who signed
Cookston's name, and that a notary is not an insurer of the truth of
the recitals. As to the omission of swearing the signer, it was stated
1958] 1219
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that this would not have ferreted out the fraud, and was therefore
not the proximate cause of the loss.
Highway Construction Bond: Thompson & Green Machinery Co. v.
M. P. Smith Const. Co.20 presented the question of whether rental of
road-building equipment was covered by Tennessee Code Annotated
section 54-519, which requires contractors with the Department of
Highways to give bond for the payment "for all materials purchased
and for all labor employed." It is also an illustration of the not uncom-
mon practice of lower courts suggesting reconsideration of earlier
decisions by which they are bound.21 The chancellor held that earlier
decisions of the supreme court required the conclusion that equipment
rental was covered,2 although he observed that if this were a question
of first impression he would have no hesitancy in holding such rental
payments to be not covered. The court of appeals affirmed, stating:
We concur in the conclusion of the Chancellor that these decisions are
controlling and, unless and until our Supreme Court modifies, distinguishes
or reverses this line of decisions we feel bound thereby.23
An uncontested consequence of the decision that such claims were
covered by section 54-519 was that the claims were payable out of the
amounts retained by the Highway Commissioner, pursuant to section
54-521 et seq.
Mechanic's Lien Law: An interesting situation developed in two
cases involving the Mechanics Lien Law. In Chattanooga Lumber &
Coal Corp. v. Phillips24 a materialman filed a bill to enforce a mechan-
ic's lien against the contractor, owner, and trustee under a deed of
trust. The bill sought sale of the property to satisfy the debt, and that
"the rights, interests and priorities be fixed and declared by the court."
Lienor claimed that as the first delivery of materials was prior to
registration of the deed of trust, the mechanic's lien was superior
thereto. The owner demurred to the bill on the ground that the lien
claim, filed as an exhibit to the bill, showed on its face it was not
acknowledged as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section
64-2201, and therefore was not entitled to registration. The demurrer
was sustained and the bill dismissed, and this action was affirmed by
the supreme court.
The materialman contended that a notice of lien did not require
20. 311 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
21. E.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948).
22. See Harris, Inc. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. P. Ry., 198 Tenn. 339, 280
S.W.2d 800 (1955); Nicks v. W. C. Baird & Co., 165 Tenn. 89, 52 S.W.2d 147
(1932).
23. 311 S.W.2d at 618.
24. 304 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1957).
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acknowledgment for registration, and that as against the owner regis-
tration is not required. In its opinion the court stated:
It cannot be doubted but that the claim of lien must be acknowledged in
compliance with the statute, otherwise it is ineffective for any purpose.25
At other places in the opinion, however, the court indicated that
acknowledgment was required to be valid against the holder of the
deed of trust.26 This latter language seemed anomalous, however, be-
cause the contentions of the materialman, as set out in the opinion,
revealed it sought recognition of the lien against the owner, and the
chancellor's action, affirmed by the supreme court, denied validity to
the lien even to this extent.
Interpreted as a decision requiring acknowledgment and registration
for a mechanic's lien to be effective against the owner of the property
subject to the lien-and such an interpretation was seemingly re-
quired by the effect of the holding-the Chattanooga Lumber case
was contra to several earlier decisions, 27 at least one of which was cited
in the opinion. It was not surprising, therefore, that within a year
thereafter this issue was again before the court. Streuli v. Brooks
28
presented substantially the same factual situation as in Chattanooga
Lumber, the only material difference being that the lienor's bill
acknowledged superiority of a deed of trust registered after the mate-
rialman's lien. On the authority of Chattanooga Lumber, the chancel-
lor sustained the owner's demurrer to the bill on the ground that
notice of the lien was not properly registered. The chancellor noted
that he could not reconcile the Chattanooga Lumber case with earlier
cases.
The supreme court in the Streuli case reversed the decree sustaining
the demurrer, and held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section
64-1112 registration is not necessary to the preservation of a furnisher's
lien as between the owner and the materialman. With respect to the
Chattanooga Lumber case, the court admitted that:
Technically, the issue presented in the Chattanooga case was whether
the furnisher had a furnisher's lien against the owner ... because of the
fact that he, the furnisher, had failed to register, in legal contemplation,
notice of its claim. That this was the issue, technically, must be recognized
by the fact that the Court was acting upon the demurrer of the owner .... 29
However, the opinion states, in that case "battle was so earnestly
waged" over the issue of priority as between the deed of trust and the
25. Id. at 85.
26. Id. at 86.
27. Green v. Williams, 92 Tenn. 220, 21 S.W. 520 (1893); Reeves v. Hender-
son, 90 Tenn. 521, 18 S.W. 242 (1891).
28. 313 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1958).
29. Id. at 263.
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furnisher's lien "as to cause this court to overlook the entire question
presented.... Thus, by this inadvertence, the court limited its con-
sideration to the question of priority .... "30 The opinion continues:
... this Court's limitation of the question actually considered and decided
must be recognized, and the language used in the opinion given effect only
within that limitation. Thus, it is the Chattanooga Lumber and Coal
Corporation v. Phillips, supra, is not authority for the proposition that,
as against the owner of the premises, registration of the furnisher's claim
notice is a statutory prerequisite of the preservation of the furnisher's
lien.31
The net result of the two decisions apparently is, therefore, that
registration is not required for preservation of a mechanic's or fur-
nisher's lien as between the lienor and the property owner. However,
for such liens to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encum-
brancers for valuable consideration without notice, registration is
required, and valid registration includes authentication as provided
in Tennessee Code Annotated section 64-2201.
Black v. Boyd32 is an interesting decision, although it does not
present a question of Tennessee law. A creditor of a bankrupt debtor
filed an action in the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee against the trustee in bankruptcy, alleging that the
debtor had obtained $2,699,491 by fraud and under such circumstances
as to make the debtor a constructive trustee. Joined as defendant was
a bank to which said sum was paid in satisfaction of a pre-existing
debt, the complaint alleging such knowledge by the bank as to make
it also a constructive trustee. The trustee filed an answer, and also a
cross-claim against the bank alleging that the payment to it constituted
a recoverable preferential transfer. Both the bank and the trustee
demanded jury trial of the issues raised by the complaint and cross-
claim, but upon motion by the creditor the district judge struck both
demands for jury trial. As the order denying jury trial was inter-
locutory and not immediately appealable,33 both bank and the
trustee petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing vacation of the
order denying jury trial, claiming that the order was a denial of the
right to a jury guaranteed by the seventh amendment.
The court of appeals issued the writ directing jury trial as to the
issues raised by the cross-claim. In its opinion, the court re-affirmed
the principle that mandamus was available only in exceptional and
extreme situations, and that it could not be utilized simply because its
denial "may require the aggrieved party to undergo a lengthy, costly
30. Id. at 264.
31. Ibid.
32. 248 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1957).
33. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
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and inconvenient trial, which might be avoided by a review of the
interlocutory order."' But relying on earlier supreme court decisions,
principally Ex parte Simons,35 it was held that denial of a right to jury
trial presents such an exceptional situation as to call for the issuance
of a mandamus to review the ruling.
Relief was restricted to the issues raised by the cross-claim, because
the creditor's action sought rescission and the imposition of a con-
structive trust, and this action being equitable, jury trial is not a mat-
ter of right. But an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover as a
voidable preference a sum of money paid by the bankrupt to a creditor
before bankruptcy, is an action at law.
The court also held that the trustee did not waive a right to jury
trial by filing in an equitable action his cross-claim for affirmative
relief, stating that the older rule holding a waiver resulted in this
situation was changed by the rules of civil procedure.36
34. 248 F.2d at 159.
35. 247 U.S. 231 (1918).
36. 248 F.2d at 163, citing six decisions in support of this ruling.
